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Hungarian
Premier Victor Orban and his ruling party Fidesz, after having received 53% of the
votes in the previous election but 68% of parliamentary seats, have transformed
Hungarian institutions, effectively asserting and entrenching control over courts
and the justice system, the media and the electoral system to align them with the
interests of the ruling party (Jan-Werner Müller and Kim Lane Scheppele have
provided compelling descriptions).
This slide to authoritarianism should be a concern to constitutionalists, wherever
it occurs, but it should be of special concern to EU citizens. Because Hungary is
a Member of the EU, Hungarian citizens are also EU citizens, Hungarian courts
are also adjudicators and implementors of EU Law, Hungarian Members of the
government are also European legislators.
So what remedies do European citizens have, as Hungarians, as non-Hungarians
living in Hungary or as non-Hungarians partially governed by EU laws in which
Hungarian officials have participated, to ensure that their rights are respected
everywhere in Europe and they are part of a community that takes seriously its
commitment to democracy and the rule of law, as Art. 2 TEU asserts? Assuming
that national remedies have been exhausted and have turned out to be futile and
that politically the channels of political change are effectively blocked on the national
level by rules drawn up to entrench the power of the ruling party, what remedies do
European citizens have?
According to the Heidelberg proposal European citizens should be able to rely on
their human rights as interpreted by European institutions against infringing acts of
states like Hungary. The significance of such an option should be clear in light of
the weakness of alternative remedies: Without such a possibility citizens could not
bring an EU human rights claim based on EU Human Rights, unless the actions of
the Hungarian government fell under the scope of EU Law.
They might turn to the Strasbourg court and rely on the ECHR, but besides work-
load issues leading to long delays it is not clear that absent direct effect, supremacy
and powerful remedies available on the EU level judgments by the Strasbourg Court
would be effectively enforceable nationally.
Of course even the Heidelberg proposal relies on the cooperation of national
courts. What if a judge, fearing retribution, refuses to make a reference? What if,
notwithstanding the clear and manifest obligations under EU Law the national courts,
packed with judges by the ruling party, simply ignore EU legal obligations in cases
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where that conflicts with core commitments of party policy as embodied in national
legislation?
In that case there would still be the possibility of the Commission or another state to
bring a case against Hungary before the ECJ. That might not resolve the issue of a
slide towards authoritarianism. But seen as a whole this is clearly a step that would
empower European citizens and strengthen the European Union as a community
committed to human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
Sceptics (like Thym and Lindseth) argue that we should be modest about the
prospects of addressing fundamentally political problems relating to a slide towards
authoritarianism through legal means focused on individuals seeking remedies
from courts. They are right only in one sense: It is not enough to focus exclusively
on legal remedies. It is also important to focus on imaginative ways to address
these problems politically. Of course it is regrettable, even scandalous, that Art.
7 of the TEU requires unanimity (rather than, say, a supermajority) to determine
that a serious threat to human rights exists in a Member State, a precondition for
imposing any remedies. This reflects the ongoing unwillingness not of "the people",
not of "states", but more specifically of executive branch of governments to relinquish
control. Such unwillingness can be criticized, in normative terms, as just one more
aspect of the capture of the European political process by the executive branch of
national governments. It
should not be normatively dignified and misunderstood as part of a sovereigns
attempt to secure democracy – there is no plausible conception of democracy that
is protected in this way, once we take for granted the level of integration already
reached in the EU.
Given this state of affairs the European Parliament, the Commission and other
Member States can not effectively address the problem of authoritarian slide directly
by focusing on the core issues, but are forced to articulate their criticisms in a way
that focuses on concerns that "fall under the scope of EU Law", even if they are the
more peripheral ones (as Daniel Thym rightly ridicules).
Even if the Heidelberg proposal should not be understood as a comprehensive
European solution to the problem of authoritarian slide in the European Union,
this should not detract from the fact that legal remedies have a productive
and independant role to play as a way of empowering and mobilizing citizens
and creating incentives for political actors to realign themselves with Europe´s
foundational commitments.
Even if the basic argument is legally plausible, there are details of the proposal, that
would need further examination: Is it really correct to limit the competence to protect
fundamental rights in case of structural deficiencies to EU citizens and exclude third
party nationals? How exactly should the abstract criteria be made workable in the
form of operational legal tests? How exactly should the cooperation with the ECHR
be structured?
I have my own views on these issues, but these are the types of issues that
lawyers can work out over time. They do not undermine the thrust of the proposal,
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which deserves to be embraced as legally sound, politically aware and practically
attractive.
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